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Abstract
Structural realism has been suggested as the best compromise in the de-
bate on scientific realism. It proposes that we should be realist about the
relational structure of the world, not its nature. However it faces an impor-
tant objection, first raised by Newman against Russell: if relations are not
qualified, then the position is either trivial or collapses into empiricism, but
if relations are too strongly qualified, then it is no longer structural realism.
A way to overcome this difficulty is to talk about modal, or nomological
relations instead of purely extensional relations. I argue that this is insuffi-
cient, for then, structural realism collapses into modal empiricism. I suggest,
however, that modal empiricism could be the best position in the debate on
scientific realism.
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Scientific realism is a family of positions according to which our best scientific
theories are true, or approximately true. Empiricism is a family of positions that
puts emphasis on the central, perhaps exclusive role of experience in knowledge
acquisition and justification. In the context of philosophy of science, empiricism
can be understood in terms of epistemic commitments toward scientific theories,
or, following van Fraassen ([1980])’s constructive empiricism, as a doctrine about
the aim of science: according to constructive empiricism, this aim is to produce
empirically adequate theories, that is to say, theories that ‘save the phenomena’,
not true theories.
The epistemological debate between scientific realism and empiricism centres
around two main arguments that push in opposite directions: the no-miracle ar-
gument and the pessimistic meta-induction. The no-miracle argument (Putnam
[1975]) claims that scientific realism is the best (or only) explanation for the em-
pirical success of scientific theories, or for the success of science in general in
producing empirically successful theories (Psillos [1999], ch. 4). The argument
puts emphasis on novel, unexpected predictions: it would be a miracle that the
extension of theories to new domains of experience that they were not designed
to account for proved successful if these theories were not true. The pessimistic
meta-induction is an induction on past scientific theories, most of which are now
abandoned, to the conclusion that contemporary theories are most probably false,
contrarily to what the no-miracle argument suggests. They cannot be considered
approximately true, because there is no ontological continuity between succes-
sive theories, and not even a continuity in the reference of theoretical terms, since
many terms used in past theories, such as ‘ether’ or ‘phlogiston’, do not refer in
light of contemporary theories (Laudan [1981]).
Worrall ([1989]) re-introduced structural realism (SR) as a solution of compro-
mise in the debate between scientific realism and empiricism. SR is the position
according to which we should only be realist about structure: the structure of our
best theories corresponds to the structure of the world. Two versions of this po-
sition can be distinguished: an epistemic version, according to which we should
remain agnostic about the nature of the world beyond its structure (we should not
interpret theoretical terms, for example, we should not assume that they refer to
natural properties), and an ontic version (French [1998]; Ladyman [1998]; Lady-
man and Ross [2007]; French [2014]), according to which the nature of the world
is structural: structure is all there is.
According to its proponents, SR can respond to the pessimistic meta-induction,
because there is a continuity of structure between successive theories: the struc-
ture of abandoned theories is generally retained in theory change. It also does jus-
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tice to the no-miracle argument, because a correspondence of structure between
our theories and the world is enough to explain their empirical success. However,
there is an influential objection against SR, called Newman’s objection, to the ef-
fect that SR would either be trivial or collapse into empiricism: it is merely com-
mitted to relations between our observations. If this is true, SR does not explain
the empirical success of theories, but merely states that success, and therefore, it
cannot account for novel predictions.
Some authors argue that talk of modal relations (or viewing the structure of the
world as a nomological structure, rather than as an extensional structure) can help
circumvent Newman’s objection. In this article, I will argue that this move does
not work: Newman’s objection still applies to modal SR, because the modal rela-
tions that survive theory change cannot be ‘real’ relations that would explain the
empirical success of theories: they are mere extensions of this empirical success
to possible phenomena. Therefore, modal SR is nothing but empiricism–albeit
modal empiricism (ME)1. Nevertheless, ME could be the best position of com-
promise in this debate, but not for the reasons structural realists are invoking.
I will first present the main objections against SR, including Newman’s ob-
jection (section 1) and the different ways one could escape Newman’s objection
(section 2). Then I will examine to what extent introducing modalities is an ac-
ceptable solution: whether modal relations survive theory change (section 3), and
whether the ones that do can explain empirical success (section 4) or correspond
to the modal structure of reality (section 5). I will conclude that modal SR col-
lapses into ME, and detail in which sense ME, although it is committed to natural
modalities, is not a realist position (section 6). To finish, I will briefly examine
how ME fares in the debate on scientific realism (section 7).
1 Objections to Structural Realism
Given that SR purports to answer two different arguments, the validity of which it
assumes, objections against the position can be broadly classified into two types:
the objections to the effect that SR cannot answer the pessimistic meta-induction
any more than standard realism does (either because it is indistinct from standard
1I use the term in the sense given by Giere in (Churchland and Hooker [1985], ch. 4) as a
position in epistemology of science. It should not be conflated with modal empiricism in general
epistemology (Roca-Royes [2007]; Hanrahan [2009]), which concerns metaphysical modalities
rather than nomological modalities, and which opposes modal rationalism rather than non-modal
empiricism.
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realism, or because there is no structural continuity in theory change), and the
objections to the effect that it cannot do justice to the no-miracle argument any
more than empiricism does.
Regarding the first type of objection, Psillos ([1995]) claims that the nature
versus structure dichotomy employed by structural realists is unclear. Accord-
ing to Psillos, standard realism has the resources to answer the pessimistic meta-
induction, but structural realism is not a consistent alternative since there is a
continuum between nature and structure rather than a strict dichotomy. The struc-
ture of a theory informs us about the nature of the entities it posits (for example,
how Newtonian mass relates to force and acceleration informs us about the nature
of mass), and structure must be interpreted for a theory to make any prediction.
In a similar vein, Papineau ([1996], p. 12) claims that a restriction of realism to
structure is no restriction at all.
Another problem in this category, noted by Newman ([2005]), is that the struc-
tural realists must explicate what exactly structural continuity amounts to, beyond
the intuitive idea that equations are somehow transposed from one theory to the
other. Without any such account, they cannot claim to answer the pessimistic
meta-induction argument. Some authors argue that there is no real continuity
of structure between successive theories, apart from empirical structures. Psillos
([1999], ch. 7) claims that not all structure is retained in theory change. Stanford
([2003]) takes the example of Galton’s law in biology, where the structural con-
tinuity is only empirical with Mendel’s theory, but no relations between posited
entities (here the genetic characteristics of ancestors of an organism) are retained.
Redhead ([2001]) takes the example of the commutativity of observables in clas-
sical and quantum mechanics to argue that structural transformations are too im-
portant in theory change to really talk about structural continuity. Bueno ([2008])
gives other examples of structural loss in theory change. More recently, Pashby
([2012]) uses the example of the discovery of the positron to show how shifts in the
metaphysical commitments of a theory may also be displayed in terms of changes
in theoretical structure. This supports Psillos’s contention that the nature-structure
dichotomy is not so clear.
A common strategy for the structural realist facing this type of difficulty is
to concentrate on well confirmed empirical relations between phenomena that are
very unlikely to disappear in theory change. Thus, against Psillos’s contention
that structure must be interpreted to make predictions, Votsis ([2004]) notes that
SR does not say that structure is not interpreted at all, but that it is only interpreted
empirically. Structural realists can refer to the principle of correspondence (Post
[1971], p. 228) for their purpose. According to this principle, ‘any acceptable new
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theory L should account for the success of its predecessor S by “degenerating”
into that theory under those conditions under which S has been well confirmed by
tests’. However, then, the ultimate benchmark for structural continuity between
theories is their predictive success, and it is not so clear that anything is retained
in theory change beyond empirical structures that are approximate and restricted
to a limited domain of experience: an empiricist with structuralist leanings would
readily agree.
This brings us to the second family of objections against SR: that SR does not
say anything beyond empiricism. The most influential objection to that effect is
dubbed Newman’s objection, after Newman ([1928])’s argument against Russell
([1927])’s version of SR2. The argument can be expressed intuitively as follows: if
relations are conceived of in purely extensional terms (a relation is defined by the
objects it relates), then it suffices that some objects exist for all relations that could
be defined between these objects to exist, mathematically speaking. So, for any
mathematical structure to exist, it is sufficient that there exist enough objects in
the world to bear that structure, and SR is a trivial position that is only committed
to a cardinal claim (the existence of a certain number of objects in the world).
To block that objection, the structuralist must say more, and qualify the kind of
relations that she is talking about to differentiate them from purely mathematical
relations, but then, the position is not purely structural: the structure must be
interpreted.
As already noted, SR can accept that the structure be interpreted empirically.
However, then, SR is only committed to a structure of observations (and a suf-
ficient number of inaccessible objects to bear that structure), and the position is
only superficially different from empiricism.
2 How to Escape Newman’s Objection?
A useful framework to examine this objection is the Ramsey sentence formalism.
It starts from the assumption that the cognitive content of a theory can be ex-
pressed as a logical sentence
∏
in a vocabulary comprising observational terms
Oi and theoretical terms Ti.
T =
∏
(O1, O2, ..., On, T1, T2, ..., Tm)
2The term ‘structural realism’ was coined later by Maxwell ([1971]), who took inspiration
from Russell.
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The idea that theoretical terms should not be interpreted can be implemented
by replacing theoretical terms by variables ti over which one quantifies existen-
tially: this is the Ramsey sentence of the theory.
(∃t1, t2, ..., tm)
∏
(O1, O2, ..., On, t1, t2, ..., tm)
The difference with the former formulation is that while the Ti, as part of our
vocabulary, are interpreted, the ti are not. According to Maxwell ([1971]), what
SR is committed to can thus be expressed by ‘rameseyfying’ theories: only the
observational terms are interpreted, but the structure of the theory is retained. In
particular, one does not have to assume that the ti refer to natural properties: they
could be multiply realisable in light of a new theory (French [2014], ch. 5.9).
This is how SR, thus formulated, can answer the pessimistic meta-induction. But
following Newman’s objection, it cannot do justice to the no-miracle argument,
because it does not explain observable regularities: it is a mere statement of these
regularities, plus a cardinal claim.
In this framework, Newman’s objection takes the form of a theorem of second-
order logic (Demopoulos and Friedman [1985]): the Ramsey sentence of a theory
is true if and only if all the empirical consequences of the theory (the observational
sentences that can be deduced from the theory) are true, and if there exist a certain
number of objects.
Some authors, such as Worrall and Zahar ([2004]), claim that this is sufficient
for structural realism: the Ramsey sentence expresses all the empirical conse-
quences of a theory, for all past, present and future phenomena in the universe, in
the most compact possible way, and this, in itself, is informative. However, con-
structive empiricism is also committed to our theories being empirically adequate
for all past, present and future phenomena, and it’s not clear what ‘informative’
means here. It is not even obvious that this compact formulation is retained in
theory change (in particular if theoretical terms of past theories do not appear any
more in new theories). If it is a way to claim that the properties and relations the
ti refer to are ‘natural’ rather than fictitious, then we are back to standard realism.
Being a theorem of second-order logic, Newman’s objection is inescapable if
one assumes that a Ramsey sentence is the right way to express the content of a
theory to which SR is committed. But perhaps this formalism unduly attributes
implicit commitments to the structural realist. Among these implicit commitments
are:
• the assumption of a dichotomy between observational and theoretical terms,
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• the assumption that a theory quantifies universally over objects, properties
and relations,
• the assumption that the content of a theory is extensional.
Melia and Saatsi ([2006]) suggest different ways to depart from this formalism
to escape Newman’s objection by rejecting one or other of these assumptions3.
First, one can add mixed predicates to the vocabulary: predicates that apply in-
differently to observable or unobservable objects (for example, an atom is smaller
than a molecule just as a cat is smaller than a dog). This is the solution envis-
aged by Cruse ([2005])4. This constitutes an improvement, but a limited one:
Newman’s objection still applies to the purely theoretical content of theories.
Second, one can restrict the intended domain of the theory instead of assum-
ing universal quantification. This can apply either to objects (for example, the
theory applies only to concrete or physical objects, not all objects) or to prop-
erties and relations. The first option amounts to applying a new predicate to all
objects concerned by the theory, but Newman’s objection also applies to the new
resulting theory, once ramseyfied, so this solution will not work. The second op-
tion amounts to qualifying properties and relations with a second-order predicate.
In this context, the question is whether one could do so without falling prey to
the pessimistic meta-induction. Melia and Saatsi consider different possibilities,
and conclude that nothing really works. If one qualifies properties and relations
as ‘natural’, then it seems that we are back to standard realism, and properties
once deemed natural (such as ‘being phlogiston’) are now considered inexistent.
But if one qualifies properties and relations as ‘qualitative’ (that is, as arbitrary
combinations of natural properties and relations) then Newman’s objection can-
not be blocked: almost any structure can be realized by qualitative properties and
relations.
3French and Ladyman ([2003]) suggested that Newman’s objection is an artefact of the state-
ment view of theories. The semantic view, by contrast, conceives of theories as collections of
models rather than sentences. In this context, structural correspondence between theories and the
world could be expressed in terms of isomorphism, or partial isomorphism. This apparently con-
stitutes a more radical departure from Ramsey sentences. However, Ainsworth ([2009]) shows
that Newman’s objection can be transposed to the semantic view. This is later acknowledged by
French ([2014], p. 126). Other authors note that the two conceptions of theories are equivalent in
certain respects (unless the semantic view is untenable–see (Halvorson [2012], pp. 203–5)). I will
consider that Melia and Saatsi’s analysis can be transposed to the semantic view.
4It could be associated with transduction, which, according to McGuire ([1970]), is a mode
of inference that played a role in Newton’s atomism. It amounts to extending characteristics of
observable objects to hypothetical, unobservable objects
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The most promising option, according to Melia and Saatsi, is to incorporate
non-extensional logic, such as modal logic, to express the fact that theoretical re-
lations express nomological relations rather than mere universal regularities. They
claim (but do not prove) that this would block the theorem supporting Newman’s
objection. I think that this is not true, as I will now explain.
3 Which Modal Relations are Retained in Theory
Change?
I claim that modal logic is not sufficient to block Newman’s objection: the posi-
tion we reach by expressing the content of our theories with modal logic is not
structural realism, but modal empiricism. Indeed, it is well known that one can
mimic modal logic in extensional logic by quantifying over possible worlds. If we
follow Melia and Saatsi’s suggestion, we can express the cognitive content of the
theory as follows, where the wi are possible worlds:
(∃t1, t2, ..., tm)(∀w1, w2, ..., wp)
∏
(O1, O2, ..., On, t1, t2, ..., tm, ..., w1, w2, ..., wp)
Perhaps the theory would also have existential quantifiers on possible worlds,
not just universal quantifiers, to express possibilities. Perhaps quantifiers would be
embedded into its formulation rather than appear at the beginning. However this
does not matter for the sake of the argument. In any case, this Ramsey sentence
is not formally different from the previous one, and there is no reason that the
same theorem would not apply. The conclusion of the theorem would be slightly
different though, since possible worlds are interpreted objects that should not be
ramseyfied. The conclusion would be the following: the modal Ramsey sentence
of a theory is true if and only if all the empirical consequences of the theory are
true in all possible worlds, and if there are enough objects in possible worlds to
bear the structure of the theory5. In sum, this version of the Ramsey sentence
merely says that our theory is empirically adequate in all nomologically possible
worlds, plus a cardinal claim.
This formulation does not say how possible worlds should be interpreted meta-
physically speaking. A minima, we are talking about natural (or nomological)
necessity, not conceptual or logical necessity, but modal relations could be causal
5I will not engage here in the debate between possibilism and actualism, that is, if we should
quantify over the same objects or different objects in all possible worlds.
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relations, or primitive laws, or relations between universals. Or perhaps nomo-
logically possible worlds are just as concrete as the actual world. In all these
cases, possible world semantic can be considered appropriate as a formal tool.
Therefore, the conclusion we reach is neutral with regards to the metaphysics of
modalities. I will return below to the question of the interpretation of modalities,
and their compatibility with an empiricist stance.
At this point, the question is the following: should a structural realist be satis-
fied with such an account? Is it enough to get ‘real’ relations? Ladyman ([2004])
suggests that a version of empiricism committed to natural modalities would be
nothing but SR. However, Ladyman does not really justify this claim, and I will
argue that this is not the case.
The answer depends on what criteria we use: what do we mean by ‘real’ re-
lations? On a first approach, we could stick to the argument that SR purports to
answer. Then we can claim that this solution does the job if (i) modal relations
survive theory change and (ii) they are sufficient to explain the empirical success
of theories. Point (ii) is crucial to know if modal SR is distinct from modal empiri-
cism, since one of the characteristic differences between realism and empiricism is
that the latter does not pretend to explain empirical success while realism, includ-
ing SR in its different guises, does (see for example Ladyman and Ross [2007],
p. 79). However, in order to tackle this question, we must first examine point (i):
whether modal relations survive theory change (and what kinds of modal relations
do).
There are intuitive reasons to believe that (i) is true. If anything is retained in
theory change, it is what Duhem ([1906]) called ‘experimental laws’. Theories of
light have changed several times since the 17th century, but they all had to account
for light reflection and refraction: they just embraced more and more phenomena
with time (diffraction, interference, . . . ). Now assuming that such experimental
laws express constraints of necessity in the phenomena they describe apparently
does nothing to alter this continuity. At most new theories will restrict the domain
to which the old theory is applicable, so that the constraints of necessity between
observable phenomena expressed are only approximate (for example, old theories
of light neglect magnetic influences, and are only valid when there is no magnetic
field). But if the new, wider range constraints are considered physically necessary,
then one could think that the old, narrower constraints are physically necessary
too, at least restricted to their domain of application.
All this seems intuitively true. However, it does not go without saying. Let us
start from the premise that a new, wide-range constraint on phenomena is a matter
of nomological necessity, and that it entails some constraint between phenomena
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A and B in the narrow context C (A could be the fact that there is an incident
ray, B the fact that there is a reflected ray with the same angle, and C the fact
that there is no magnetic field). This can be expressed as follows, with modal
operators indicating nomological necessity:
(C → (A→ B))
However, it is not possible, from this premise, to deduce the following:
C → (A→ B)
This could only be deduced if C was necessary, but unless all facts are neces-
sary, which would trivialize our position, we cannot assume it: the fact that there
is no magnetic field at some place in the universe is not necessary, but contingent.
In other words, if the new theory says: it is necessary that in context C, there
is a relation between A and B, that does not entail that in context C, there is a nec-
essary relation between A and B. This might not be so much of a problem for an
empiricist, who could say that the old theory is still modally adequate if we prag-
matically restrict the range of possible worlds to that where C is the case. After
all, there are many kinds of relative modalities: for example, technical modalities,
which depend on our technical limitations (I will return to the way an empiricist
could interpret this kind of relative modality below). But for the structural realist,
the fact that there is no necessary relation between A and B, but only between
A, B and C, is problematic because the relation between A and B does not cor-
respond in any sense to the fundamental, modal structure of the world: it only
corresponds to the structure of phenomena in situations where C holds; that is to
say, it is relative to a context where C is the case. But the fact that C holds in
some places, and not others, is contingent, not necessary.
Perhaps the law of the old theory could be seen as an approximation of the
new law. Let us say that a modal statement approximates a law of necessity if
it is true in ‘most possible contexts’. The problem with this strategy is that it
requires one to provide a measure on contexts, and it is not obvious how to do
so, and whether it makes sense at all. Different contexts could correspond to
different models in the new theory, and a theory does not provide a measure on its
models. Even granting that it makes sense, it does not seem that the law of an old
theory of light that, say, does not take into account magnetic influences, would
approximate the law of the new theory, except if we choose an ad-hoc measure on
contexts: arguably, there are many more possible configurations of the magnetic
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field where the old law would fail than where the old law would succeed, and in
light of theory change, the success of the old law is better accounted for by the
fact that we live in places where the magnetic field is weak than by the fact that
it could approximate a strict law of necessity. So the relations that are retained
in theory change are either contingent, or if modal, they are only so in a relative
sense, as are technical modalities, but they are not absolutely modal, nor do they
approximate absolutely modal relations.
Maybe this will be more clear with an example. Take Galileo’s law of free fall,
according to which all falling objects accelerate at 9.8m/s2. The law is certainly
retained in contemporary physical theories in the sense given by Post’s principle
of correspondence mentioned above. However, there is no sense in which it is a
modal relation pertaining to the fundamental structure of the world: the number
‘9.8’, although it is part of the mathematical structure of this law, does not ap-
pear in contemporary physics, and not even the idea of constant acceleration is
retained. Arguably, this law only approximates contemporary ones in a tiny range
of possible contexts. This law is rather, in light of new theories, a contingent em-
pirical consequence of the fact that we live on the surface of the earth, and that
the earth has a given mass and a given size, but all these contextual aspects, and
the way they are involved, are only accessible from the new theories. There is no
problem, from an empiricist perspective, in making this kind of relation relative to
our epistemic situation in the world, since, after all, an empiricist is often willing
to accept that the content of our representation is not absolute but relative to our
epistemic position. But postulating a relation of correspondence between this law
and the modal structure of the world is more problematic given that it appears to
be merely contingent. So it is not true that modal relations are retained in theory
change, or at least, not the kind of modal relation a realist would call for.
4 Are Modal Relations Real?
Let us now turn to (ii): in what sense would the modal Ramsey sentence constitute
an explanation for the empirical success of theories? The idea behind the no-
miracle argument is that the fact that the entities postulated by a theory really exist
explains the observable phenomena the theory accounts for. But here, rather than
positing real entities, it seems that we have merely extended empirical adequacy
to other possible worlds, and it is dubious that such an extension could constitute
an appropriate explanation (see van Fraassen ([1989], ch. 4.7) for arguments).
Rather than focusing on possible worlds, one could claim that we are postu-
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lating nomological constraints on the phenomena, and that these constraints are
the entities that explain observable regularities in the actual world. But in what
sense are these nomological constraints ‘real entities’? Reality is generally cast in
terms of mind-independence. We have two options here: either these relations are
‘real’ because they are relations between real, mind-independent entities, or they
are real ‘in themselves’, that is, the relations themselves are mind-independent.
The first option corresponds to how epistemic versions of SR, following the
lead of Poincaré and Russell, traditionally conceive of real relations. We saw that
Newman’s objection undermines this view: inaccessible objects play no role in
SR, since they only have to be in sufficient number to bear the structure of the
theory, so the relevant relations to which SR is committed are actually relations
between our observations only. As we saw, the same argument applies to modal
SR as well: the relations to which modal SR is committed are only relations be-
tween our observations, and inaccessible objects play no particular role.
Perhaps, however, possible observations could count as real entities? One
could argue that possible observations are mind-independent, because they are
never actually observed. Then modal relations would qualify as relations between
real objects. But note that past, future or remote observable phenomena are also
mind-independent in this sense. They do not have to be actually observed to ex-
ist. However, an empiricist like van Fraassen would accept that our theories are
empirically adequate for all observable phenomena in the universe, including phe-
nomena that are not actually observed. The crux here is that mind-independence
can be understood in two ways: something is mind-independent either if it does
not depend on actually being observed, or if its nature is independent of our con-
ceptualisation of it (but could still correspond to it). We can get the first kind
of mind-independence with possible observations, but not the second kind, since
possible observations are still conceptualized as observations, and if constructive
empiricism is not a brand of realism, the first kind of mind-independence is insuf-
ficient for genuine realism.
The second option is to assume that it is modal relations that are real, not what
they relate. In other words, the solution is to move to an ontic version of SR, fol-
lowing the lead of Cassirer ([1937]) and Eddington ([1955]) rather than Poincaré
and Russell, whereby relations are primitive, and the relata are fully determined
by the relations in which they take part (or the two are in a co-determination
relationship–see (French [2014]) for a review). Cassirer and Eddington conceived
of relations as mental entities, but if we are realist, then we can conceive of these
relations as primitive ontological entities, and assume a correspondence between
the structure of our representations and reality. However, there are problems with
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this move.
A problem that has been discussed at length in the literature is that it is hard to
make sense of relations without relata, and still make a distinction between math-
ematical and physical structure (see for example (Cao [2003]; Psillos [2015])).
Defenders of ontic SR want modalities to be the distinctive feature, and at the
same time, they assume that the relata of the structure are fully determined by
their position in the structure. But how shall we make sense of this? Take the
example of a probabilistic law that would say that if A is the case, then B will
occur with probability p and B′ will occur with probability 1− p, where A, B and
B′ are observable states of affairs. If following ontic SR the modal structure is
‘all there is’, then something is obviously missing in our ontology: the fact that
in such a situation, B actually occurs rather than B′ is not entailed by the law
itself. Perhaps one could reduce this aspect to an indexical component by being
a modal realist in the sense of Lewis ([1973]) (here restricted to nomologically
possible worlds): B and B′ both occur in different concrete possible worlds, and
the fact that B actually occurs only means that we are located in a world where B
occurs. But if this is the case, either the law is no longer primitive: it supervenes
on real states of affairs distributed in different possible worlds, or if the nature and
distribution of these states of affairs are fully determined by the laws themselves,
it’s not clear that SR does not collapse into some form of Pythagoreanism: all we
are left with is a mathematical structure of concrete, possible worlds.
The problem is reminiscent of Newman’s objection analysed in section 2. One
could eschew Pythagoreanism by qualifying the structure, and in a sense, ‘primi-
tively modal’ could be viewed as a mere qualification, but as we saw in section 2,
this qualification will be either too strong to survive theory change, or too weak
to escape triviality (see (Ainsworth [2009]) for related arguments).
So as a minimum, we must assume that actual relata exist on a par with a prim-
itive modal structure for this structure to be physical rather than mathematical, and
that these actual relata are not determined by the structure. Psillos ([2015]) makes
a similar point, noting that laws of nature do not determine the initial conditions
of the universe. French ([2014], ch. 10) also acknowledges this point, and talks
about existential witnesses (drawing on the distinction between determinable and
determinate). But these witnesses cannot be real inaccessible objects, otherwise
the position is not informative (for the reasons given by Newman’s objection), and
if they are our actual observations, it seems that we are back to where we started:
the relations we postulate are merely interpreted in relation to our observations,
and they are not conceptually mind-independent. At most they would deserve the
‘primitively modal’ qualification in addition to this empirical interpretation.
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None of this is really new, but the problem is somehow strengthened by our
observations from the previous section: modal relations that survive theory change
generally become relative to an epistemic context in the process. This shows that
the ‘primitively modal’ qualification is too strong to sustain ontic SR in the face of
the pessimistic meta-induction: either the relations that survive theory change are
not modal, but contingent, or if they are modal in a restricted sense, they are not
primitive, but relative to our specific epistemic position. It does not seem that this
qualification can be weakened without thereby undermining the realist component
of ontic SR: non-modal relations are merely mathematical, and relatively-modal
relations depend too much on our epistemic position to be ‘real’. So even if it
were possible to make sense of modal relations being real without collapsing into
Pythagoreanism, the solution is not viable, because primitive, modal relations do
not survive theory change.
5 Relativity and Fundamentality
The analysis above applies quite straightforwardly to versions of SR that maintain
that our physical theories represent the fundamental modal structure of the world,
given that a relatively modal relation R cannot count as fundamental in a world
where (C → R) is the case. This applies in particular to French’s version,
and its repeated emphasis on fundamentality (French [2014], p. 44, p. 114, ch.
10). However, SR, even in its ontic version, is not a monolithic doctrine, and one
could wonder whether less metaphysically inclined versions could accommodate
relative modalities.6
According to Ladyman and Ross ([2007]), the modal relations science de-
scribes need not be fundamental. In particular, the ‘real patterns’ discovered by
special sciences are specific to certain domains or scales and are relative to (‘pro-
jectible under’) perspectives (Ladyman and Ross [2007], ch. 4.4). Ladyman and
Ross go as far as claiming that they can make sense of relative necessity (Lady-
man and Ross [2007], p. 288). This seems at odds with our contention that modal
relations that are relative to our epistemic context cannot count as real.
Note, however, that the relativity invoked by Ladyman and Ross is not enrolled
in discussions on theory change, but rather on scales and fundamentality. In their
account, the perspective to which modal relations are relative can be specified
by ‘locators’. This might be fine for the prospect of understanding the role of
6I am thankful to anonymous referees for raising this point.
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special sciences, but in the context of theory change, the relevant context is only
accessible in light of a new theory, and so we are in no position to claim that
contemporary theories are structurally true relative to a specific context (at least
not without alluding to our epistemic position).
Moreover, the problem we are confronted with is not so much a problem of
fundamentality. The notion of locators Ladyman and Ross employ seems inap-
propriate for our purpose. The notion is apparently extensional (Ladyman and
Ross [2007], ch. 2.3.4). It amounts to limiting the domain of a theory to part of
the actual universe (the parthood relation involved need not be spatio-temporal: it
could be, for example, ‘at a certain scale’, or ‘for a particular set of actual phe-
nomena’). However, old and new theories of light alike apply to the same type
of phenomena, at the same scale, and as we have seen in section 3, limiting the
domain of a theory to parts of the actual universe where C is the case will not
make its modal statements true, unless C is necessarily the case in those parts of
the universe. So for example, limiting the domain of an old theory of light to parts
of the universe where there is no magnetic field will not make its laws true as a
matter of necessity, insofar as there could have been a strong magnetic field in
those places. In sum, the appropriate limitation for our modal statements is not
extensional, but intensional: it is a limitation in terms of possible contexts, where
some background conditions that are not specified by the theory must hold in all
relevant possibilities.
Finally, note that even though Ladyman and Ross assume that special sciences
describe real patterns that are only present at certain scales, they entertain a more
ambitious stance towards physics. According to them, fundamental physics dis-
covers structures of a ‘higher level of necessity’. It is responsible for supporting
counterfactuals across the entire actual universe: the residual relativity of modal
statements is relativity to contingent ‘structural facts about the whole universe’,
such as its initial conditions. This is why fundamental physics ‘gives the modal
structure of the world’ (Ladyman and Ross [2007], p. 288).
Such a stance seems necessary for SR to qualify as a version of realism. To
that effect, Ladyman and Ross ([2007], p. 99)’s claim that ‘ontic structural realism
ought to be understood as modal structural empiricism’ is instructive. Why clas-
sify this position as a brand of realism? For them, ‘[modal empiricism] is a form
of structural realism because according to it the theoretical structure of scientific
theories represents the modal structure of reality’ (Ladyman and Ross [2007], p.
111) (I will take the faithfulness of this representation to be implicit here). What
a faithful representation is, and how it latches onto reality, can be understood in
different ways in a structuralist context (see French [2014], ch. 5.10), but one
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would expect that a notion of truth (perhaps partial or approximate truth) that is
not epistemically constrained, such as correspondence truth, would be involved at
some point.7 This should be the case even within a fallibilist approach, wherein
SR proponents would grant that theoretical modal statements are revisable and
that contemporary theories of fundamental physics are not at the stage of com-
posing a ‘grand unified theory’ (as exemplified by French [2014], p. 163). They
should assume that contemporary theories still approximately capture part of the
modal structure of reality.
Yet as we have seen here and in section 3, there is no sense in which a state-
ment R could strictly, partly or approximately correspond to a modal structure
described by (C → R). Furthermore, qualifying the relations as ‘relatively
modal’ without specifying the background conditions to which they are relative
could lead to triviality in the context of Newman’s objection. In light of this, we
should assume, at most, that our theories capture the modal structure of observa-
tions that are accessible from our epistemic context. Let us call the corresponding
position modal empiricism (ME). This ineliminable reference to an epistemic con-
text that we are in no position to specify any further until a new theory arrives is
precisely what makes ME a version of empiricism rather than realism: only an
epistemically constrained notion of truth, such as pragmatic truth, will account
for it.
In sum, Ladyman and Ross’s version of ontic structural realism might be as
close to ME as SR can get, but their contention that physics gives us the modal
structure of the world makes it a distinct position, and unless they provide an ac-
count of partial or approximate truth for relative modalities that solves the prob-
lems mentioned here, their position cannot be sustained in the face of the pes-
simistic meta-induction.
6 Is Modal Empiricism Really Empiricism?
Our conclusion so far is that Newman’s objection also applies to the modal ver-
sions of SR: modal SR, if it is to survive theory change, collapses into a version
of empiricism, albeit a modal one. Still, one could remain unconvinced that ME
is really empiricism. Empiricists are generally suspicious about natural modali-
ties, which they generally consider part of an ‘inflationary metaphysics’ (see for
7Arguably, an epistemically constrained notion of truth, such as pragmatic truth, is incompat-
ible with realism. For example, Ladyman and Ross take a pragmatic stance towards individual
objects, the existence of which they deny.
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example van Fraassen [1989]). This is certainly true if modalities are posited to
explain observable regularities. But one could well consider that ME does not
explain anything, but merely extends empirical adequacy to possible worlds (or,
as I will suggest below, to possible situations).
As emphasized above, the difference between realism and empiricism might
be best expressed in terms of correspondence truth. The realist assumes that our
representations correspond to a mind-independent reality, while the empiricist
merely assumes that they ‘save the phenomena’. If we accept this way of framing
the distinction, then there is a sense in which modalities can be regimented into
an empiricist framework. The way to do this is to translate modal statements not
in terms of a direct correspondence to nomological relations, but into warranted
expectations about our future experiences (such as: if we were to do A, we would
observe B). In sum, the idea is to apply a pragmatic theory of truth to modalities
rather than a correspondence theory of truth. After all, Peirce, who introduced
pragmatism, was committed to the existence of necessity in the world (Peirce was
only a self-proclaimed realist in a weak sense, refusing the correspondence the-
ory of truth), and if Peirce’s philosophy is consistent, there should not be any
incompatibility between the two.
A pragmatic evaluation of modal relations is available to us so long as the re-
lata of these relations are not inaccessible objects, but observations, which is the
case here. And if, as I have argued, modal relations must be considered relative to
an epistemic context in order to survive theory change, this is the only interpreta-
tion available to us: there is no sense in which any modal relation entailed by our
theories would correspond to a nomological constraint independent of our epis-
temic position. Indeed, according to ME, it can be true, for all practical purposes,
that if we had thrown an object, it would have accelerated at 9.8m/s2 towards the
ground. But this modal statement is only pragmatically true because we consider
a certain epistemic context to be fixed (the fact that we are here, on earth). It does
not correspond to any absolute necessity, not even approximately so. The earth
could lose part of its mass following a cosmic disaster, which would make this
statement false. Yet this is still a modal statement, and it can still be pragmatically
true, relative to a background context held fixed.
A nice framework for analysing modal statements pragmatically is a possi-
ble situations semantic, where situations are partial, rather than complete, worlds
(Kratzer [2008]). The idea is to conceive of possible situations as alternative ways
actual situations could be, considering variations in some accessible characteris-
tics of situations, ‘all else being equal’. The extent of conceivable possibilities can
be apprehended in terms of possible values for measurable properties (given the
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precision of our apparatus). The modal empiricist would assume that only some of
these conceivable possibilities are nomologically possible, and that it is a matter
of empirical inquiry to know which ones are. This way, implicit background con-
ditions and contextual aspects (for example, the fact that we are here, on earth, that
the earth has a given size, . . . ) can be held fixed in the evaluation of modal state-
ments, by directly referring to actual situations of reference, even though these
background conditions cannot be listed or even known exhaustively. This context
will take the form of unspecified intensional constraints on the range of possibili-
ties that are accessible to us given our epistemic position at one point in time. This
is the way relative modal statements can be captured in this framework: the con-
straints on possibilities that the modal empiricist assumes are only valid relative
to these unspecified background conditions, and we need not assume that these
background conditions are plausible, or correspond to ‘most possible contexts’:
they are pragmatically held fixed by fiat. I will adopt this framework from now
on.
There must certainly be some modal constraints in the world for our expecta-
tions to be fulfilled in all possible circumstances, even if they are restricted to a
context. A modal empiricist must assume that there are possibilities in the world
and constraints on these possibilities (I will return to this aspect below). However,
by assuming that a modal relation obtains pragmatically, one is not speculating
on the metaphysical nature of the constraints involved, nor is one claiming that
they correspond absolutely to the modal relation under consideration. A prag-
matic evaluation of a modal statement in terms of observational expectations, even
though it implies that there are constraints on possibilities in the world, does not
constitute an explanation of any sort for one’s specific expectations in the situation
at hand. It is a mere statement of these expectations. Therefore, being committed
to the modal Ramsey sentence of a theory does not mean being a structural realist,
pace Ladyman.
The fact that our expectations are warranted (that they are not mere wishes) is
however essential for the truth of the corresponding modal statement, so let us say
a little bit more on the question of justification.
Another way to characterize the contrast between empiricism and realism is
methodological. Correspondence truth introduces a gap between truth and our
capacity to know that something is true from experience alone. Realists are gen-
erally willing to fill this gap by resorting to non-empirical criteria of justification,
such as explanatory power, simplicity and fruitfulness. These non-empirical crite-
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ria can be subsumed under abduction8, or inference to the best explanation, which
is involved in the no-miracle argument (that is, non-empirical criteria are consti-
tutive of a good explanation). By contrast, empiricists would view non-empirical
criteria as pragmatic or heuristic devices. They would at most assume that induc-
tion is warranted, and therefore remain agnostic about the truth of our theories.
In a possible situation framework, if one assumes that actual, experienced sit-
uations are a representative sample of a range of possible situations (alternative
ways actual situations could be), ME does not need abduction for its justifica-
tion, but only induction: an induction on possible situations and configurations,
of which observed ones are a representative sample. Having seen all objects in
free fall accelerate around us at a certain rate, the modal empiricist is justified in
believing that all objects would accelerate at the same rate if they were in free fall,
whatever their initial position or speed (note that this is not an attempt to explain
a regularity, but a mere induction). Extending her inquiry to different domains,
she may realize that this law is not universally true: objects do not accelerate at
the same rate at higher altitudes. An abductive inference towards the existence of
a modal relation that would correspond to the initial acceleration (and explain it)
would thus be invalidated. However, the original modal statement, once restricted
to a certain context, is still justified by induction.
Note that this fits quite well with scientific practice, at least intuitively: scien-
tists usually test their theories in various configurations, acting on relevant param-
eters, as if they were proceeding to an induction on all possible values for these
parameters. They also contrast alternative hypotheses by implementing config-
urations where these hypotheses would make different predictions. This can be
viewed as an inductive process on possibilities, and not actualities, since the prior
assumption that a configuration actually occurs or not in the universe seems irrel-
evant to their motivation to implement it. Intuitively, only the fact that it could
occur, and that they want to know what would happen in that case (which hypoth-
esis would be confirmed), seems relevant.
So far, we have been talking about specific constraints of necessity, but what
about the more general assumption that there are possibilities in the world? This
assumption is required for our inductive process, but isn’t it at odds with empiri-
cism?
There is an intuitive sense in which this assumption is part of our experience.
Some cognitive theorists claim that possibilities of action are part of our phe-
8Note that Peirce, who introduced the term, did not view abduction as a principle of justifica-
tion, contrarily to contemporary realists, but rather as a principle of discovery (Nyrup [2015]).
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nomenology (Gibson [1986]; Nanay [2011]). The possibility of inferring meta-
physical assumptions from our phenomenology could be challenged, but in any
case, no epistemological position comes completely devoid of metaphysical com-
mitments. Van Fraassen ([2002]) is well aware that an epistemological position
cannot be justified by experience alone, and casts empiricism as a ‘stance’ for
this very reason. ME might be a little more adventurous than constructive em-
piricism in this respect, but insofar as the specific modal relations that appear in
the modal Ramsey sentence of a theory do not count as explanations, but as ex-
tensions of universal regularities, insofar as they are justified by induction rather
than by abduction, and insofar as the modal empiricist does not assume that they
must approximately capture the modal structure of reality, ME does not qualify as
a brand of scientific realism.
7 CouldModal Empiricism be the Best of BothWorlds?
In this article, I have argued that modal relations do not survive theory change,
contrarily to what SR assumes, unless they are considered relative to a contingent
epistemic context, which makes them unfit to sustain a realist position. I have also
argued that, nevertheless, modal relations that are relative to an epistemic context
can be interpreted pragmatically in full compatibility with empiricism and with
an inductive epistemology. SR thus either collapses into ME, or falls prey to the
pessimistic meta-induction. To conclude, let us examine briefly how ME fares in
the debate on scientific realism.
A modal empiricist should not worry too much about the pessimistic meta-
induction since, as we have seen, the modal relations she is committed to survive
theory change. Past theories are still modally adequate in a restricted domain of
experience (in a range of possible situations) and science advances by accumulat-
ing empirical knowledge. Scientific progress can be viewed as an extension of the
range of epistemic contexts available to us, which does not mean that we could be
free of any epistemic context at any point in time, or that we could claim to have
access to ‘most possible epistemic contexts’, whatever that means. Now, should
the modal empiricist worry about the no-miracle argument?
The modal empiricist cannot claim to explain the empirical success of theo-
ries: she is merely extending this success to possible situations. This is why ME
is not a version of realism. However, ME might have the resources to answer the
no-miracle argument in a different way. Indeed, we can expect that a modally
adequate theory will be empirically adequate in situations it was not designed
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to account for if these situations are only considered possible in our epistemic
context prior to their occurrence, in the same way that a constructive empiricist
would readily extend empirical adequacy to hitherto unobserved phenomena (but
perhaps the constructive empiricist would have to remain agnostic about hitherto
unobserved configurations, insofar as she does not know if they are actual or not
prior to their occurrence). And in the case of a new theory that has not yet been
properly tested, successful novel predictions merely confirm that the theory can
be extended to a new range of phenomena; yet promising theories can fail in this
respect, as has happened in the past. So ME could be the best position of compro-
mise in the debate on scientific realism: not because it would explain the empirical
success of theories, but because if the aim of science is to produce modally ade-
quate theories, then the success of novel predictions is no miracle: it is either the
first step of an induction on possible situations that will confirm a theory’s modal
adequacy, at least in a certain context, or, in the case of theories that have already
been tested, it is a mere consequence of their modal adequacy, and it is full part of
our expectations. However, the eventual failure of these theories when we extend
the range of experimental contexts, and the need for a new theory to address new
experimental results, should not come as a surprise either.
All this is only a proposal at this stage. Developing the idea further is beyond
the scope of this paper. I merely want to stress that in one sense, structural realists
could be right that one can have the best of both worlds (to take Worrall’s words)
by focusing on the modal structure of theories. Their only mistake is to classify
their position as a version of scientific realism, while if it is to survive theory
change, it can be nothing but empiricism.
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